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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
POLLY LUND,

Psl.aintiff-Appellant,~

-V

Case No. 8707

ORIN L. LUND,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ·THE CASE
This i.s a case on appeal from a decision of Judge
Maurice Harding sitting specially on a subsequent, restricted portion of a divorce proceeding, in the District
Court for Salt Lake County. The appeal involves only
issues after the entry of an interlocutory decree in favor
of plaintiff, the subsequent matters pertaining to an
attempted reconciliation during the pendency of disposition of motions for a new trial and to amend the earlier
findings. The parties attempted a reconciliation, but
the misconduct found by the earlier trial court was resumed making the attempted reconciliation a failure.
Judge Harding, against the uncontested and undisputed
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evidence of resumption of the misconduct, found plain~
tiff-appellant, by resumption of the marital relation,
condoned the offenses found in the originail decree, and
entered a decree estopping appellant from asserting accrued rights, and nulifying the decree of divorce.
The original divorce decree in favor of plaintiffappellant is not before this court on appeal as neither
party has raised any questions concerning same. The
court trying that original case entered Findings, Conclu~
sions, and a Decree all of which reflected that respondent had been cruel to appellant, and required that he pay
$175 per month alimony and support money among other
things. This he failed to do. He filed motions to modify
Findings, and for a new tria;l, but prior to action on said
motions, the parties attempted a reconciliation. This
failed. Defendant-respondent resumed the misconduct,
and grossly compounded his faults. Judge Larson, who
had tried the original case, saved any question of condonation in ultimately over-ruling the motions for new trial
and amendment of findings. It was the question of
condonation, ·and the right of appellant to receive accrued
alimony and support money, that was the subject of the
hearing by Judge Harding on April 3, 1957 which resulted in that judge finding condonation and depriving
appellant of her divorce and the money judgment. This
appeal is addressed to the error of Judge Harding in so
ruling.
The principle a.spect of this appeal, in relation to
that ruling, is the fact concerning the resumption of
respondent's misconduct, the conditions attached by
·2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant to the attempted reconciliation, and the breaking by the respondent of those conditions. The law on
the case has been clearly stated by this court in two
recent case.s of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573,
236 P. 2d 1066, and Beezley v. Beezley, 296 P. 2d 274.
It is appellant's contention that the court erred as
follows:
1. It failed to make Findings in accordance with
the uncontested evidence that there was a resumption of
the misconduct.

2. It failed to make findings that there were conditions aUached to the reconciliation, on which the evidence was uncontested.
3. It made a fundamental finding that the reconciliation was without express condition (Tr. 143) which
wa.s contrary to the evidence.
4. It failed to apply the law as stated by this court
in the MacDonald .and Beezley cases.
5. It deprived appellant of due process of law in
taking away from her vested rights to receive money and
property before decreed to her.
In a supplemental appeal, appellant is perfecting her
claim to receive:
1. Temporary alimony and support money pending
the appeal.

2. Temporary attorney fe:es and costs, among other
things, and for contempt against defendant.
-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This is a summary of the facts and procedures.
1. An interlocutory decree of divorce was signed
by Judge Martin Larson on February 10, 1954, (Tr. 1224) after he had entered a memorandum decision at page
10 of Transcript. He found that plaintiff-appellant had
been and was very ill; that defendant-respondent had
quarreled, had nagged .at her without just cause; that
he posse1ssed certain sexual paraphernalia suggesting
possible infidelity that cau.sed appellant great emotional
distress ; that he absented himself often at night with no
explanation; that he did not love her; that his attitude
toward the marriage was not sound and wholesome,
that it was dictatorial; that he lacked courtesy and grace
during her serious illness and gave no cooperation; that
much of the family fortune had come from appellant's
hard work, which, becau.se of her illness she could not
resume; that she had been a good wife; that in his military travels respondent did not want appellant to accompany him. In his memorandum decision Judge Larson stated "If this attitude .and manner at home was 50%
of that displayed in court, we may doubt any woman
could live long with him and maintain her sanity." (Tr.
10, 13)

2. The court awarded plaintiff $175 per month
alimony and support money "such payments to be made
regardless of any motions for new trial or appellate
procedures that might be instituted by defendant," (Tr.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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22) and in addition ordered him to pay certain bills, and
keep certain insurance policies in force. ( Tr. 23) Plaintiff was awarded the mink after finding that defendant
had made an absolute gift of them to her in consideration
of her staying at home during his travels. (Tr. 14) She
also was awarded the equity in the house, however
monthly payments of $87.50 were and are required to
keep the equity alive. ( Tr. 22, 1)
3. Soon after the Findings and Decree were .signed,
respondent filed motions for amendment of Findings,
or a New Trial (Tr. 25) which were not disposed of until
after the attempted reconciliation had failed. "I will
state that both sides, so f.ar as counsel are concerned,
together with the trial court that has handled this matter,
have worked sincerely to effect a reconciliation of these
parties." (Tr. 82) It was for this reason that there was
long delay in the court entering its decree overruling
respondent's motion for new trial, dated January 15,
1957. (Tr. 45)

4. During the interlocutory perrod, and in early
May 1954 the parties commenced discussion of reconciliation. It was principally on account of their minor son
James, about age 8 at the time, that the parties got back
together. (Tr. 53, 1)
5. The issue of how they got back together .and
its consequences were s·aved by Judge Larson for any
subsequent trial either party desired. (Tr. 45) Respondent-defendant insisted in a pleading at page 41 of the
-5-
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transcript that the reconciliation amounted to a condonation. Appellant traversed such a claim in a pleading
at page 43 of the transcript, stating that respondent had
not acted in good faith in the attempted reconciliation,
and had among other things, resumed the misconduct before found by Judge Larson. It was this issue that was
tried by Judge Harding, and the circumstances of the
reconciliation were heard. The record before this court
is principally on that subject.
Prior to the commencement of the hearing the court
and counsel discussed procedure and the law at which
time the court stated in effect that if the parties had lived
together for more than a year, the law would require him
to find plaintiff had condoned defendant's misconduct,
but upon insistance of plaintiff's counsel, the hearing
was had. Reference is made to the said conference at
page 11 of plaintiff's brief to the court, (Tr. ____ ) It is
hence most important to a disposition of this appeal that
the facts developed at the trial concerning the reconciliation and life together should be understood.
6. That the attempted reconciliation in May 1954
was not eagerly sought by either party is apparent; it
was done out of regard for the child. (Tr. 52) The difficulties before encountered, and found by Judge Larson,
were thoroughly discus.sed for a long time. The good
offices of Stake President Harline, were utilized by both
parties. ( Tr. 55, 108) The charges and countercharges,
about which the original proceeding was had, were discussed. These involved the evidences of infidelity upon
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which Findings were made, among other things. (Tr.
79, 109, 13). Those paraphernalia (condrums and leud
handkerchiefs) which had been upsetting to plaintiff
were discussed with the stake president, defendant pleading his innocence, plaintiff reporting that, he claimed, "I
had misjudged him and that he wa.sn 't guilty; he was a
clean man." (Tr. 79) Plaintiff felt her husband had not
been honest with her over the past years. It was this subject of honesty that played a major part in the reconciliation, and was a condition to resumption of marital relations. (Tr. 56)
Defendant's counsel on direct examination of Mrs.
Lund asked:

"Q. Were there any promises made by either of
you about anything that concerned the divorce~

A. Y es~that the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth would be told by both
of us, completely. In fact I specified that to
Orin, because that has been one of my complaints with Orin, is that he has not told me
the truth, and I specified that I wanted the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth about everything, what he did and why
he was doing it.'' (Tr. 56)
There were a multitude of things discu,ssed which we will
only summarize, but the testimony of both parties is
clear and uncontradicted that Orin, was to improve his
conduct. They were to "get their house in order," go
through the temple, have Jimmie sealed to them. Defendant himself testified: " ... We went to Harline's
-7-
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home ... discussed all our differences over money, these
condrums and the handkerchiefs ..." (Tr. 108) ... "we
went back together. Everything was to be above board
and out in the open;" things would be confidential between them, and everything he had was to be her's, and
everything she had was to be his. (Tr. 113)
7. As a result of these discussions, they resumed
their marital relationship and lived a relaJtively happy
life for about a year. (Tr. 55) She mistakenly believed
during this period that he was doing as he promised, and
thaJt all the money from their efforts was going into a
joint bank account. However, he had a separate account
which he did not disclose to her, (Tr. 97) this during the
time when all was supposed to be going well. The court
struck Mrs. Lund's statement that the concealment of
the funds used in Florida violated the agreement of reconciliation. His bank statements on this concealed account were sent to another address; (Tr. 115) and his
mother, no!t his wife, had the sole power to the funds in
case of Orin's death. (Tr. 119) Exhibit 38 is his own
check book showing the dates after reconciliation when
he made deposits and withdrawals, and it can be ~een
that he was keeping funds from the joint account, unto
himself, contrary to the reconciliation agreement. He
also practiced de·ceit in relations with plaintiff's mother
regarding the moving of the mink, which upset plaintiff,
during a time when Judge Harding assumed all was
going well. (Tr. 101)
8. Then on Mother's day, 1955 the real break in the
attempted reconciliation commenced; defendant had re-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fused to go to church with his child and wife; he returned
from being on the property the court had awarded to
him, was "antagonistic and vicious towards me and said
he was going to leave me and when he left me he was
going to leave me absolutely penniless, cut my allowance
out until I would never know I had a penny." (Tr. 59)
It is here that the real resumption of the old misconduct
comes into the open, and it was climaxed four months
later with brutality. We will scan only the high lights
of his resumption:
a. INDIFFERENCE IN HER SICKNESS: Plaintiff was ho.spitalized for surgery. Defendant stayed
away. (Tr. 60)
b. EYE TROUBLE : She lost the sight of one eye.
It antagonized him. He reacted as the court had found
before. (Tr. 61, 14)
c. DRUNKENESS : He returned from a trip to
Albuquerque in a drunken condition, completely exhausted, having taken liquor along over her pro,test, (Tr.
62) this at a time when he was needed in ·the mink operation. He came home often in drunken condition. (Tr. 64)
d. INDIFFERENT TO HER: It was none of her
business where he had been, what he was doing. (Tr. 64,
65, 66, 67)
e. SMELLED OF PERFUME: Several Sundays
he would come home late smelling of perfume he did not
use. (Tr. 64)
-9-
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f. ILLEGITIMATE SEX: " . . . he said to me
rather _snottily that I didn't need to think I had anything
too wonderful, that he knew if he couldn't get it at home
legitimately, that he could get it illegitimately." (Tr. 66)
g. ARGUMENTATIVE: "He was argumentative
and he picked on everything, he was critical; nothing
pleased him and he just came and went as he pleased.
S.aid nothing to me, discussed nothing with me, was most
argumentative, mean, hateful." (Tr. 67)
h. MYSTERIOUS PHONE CALLS came from
men and women, late hours, his callers would disguise
their voices. ('Tr. 67)
i. GUARD ENCAMPMENT: He attended, taking
street clothe.s, not needed, remaining away three weeks
when two weeks only were required, this at a time when
his help was needed in the mink, and she was too ill to do
the work. (Tr. 68)
j. RIFLE TEAM: He returned from the extended
stay .at Guard Encampment, changed clothes and repreS'ented he had to leave again to take a sick man for the
N,ational Guard to the middle west, and did not stay even
a night with his sick wife and child. His wife learned
he had lied to her and had taken the Guard rifle team on
a junket. When he returned he was in a drunken conditjon. (Tr. 68, 69, 110)
k. PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDE: "I wanted to be
your wife more than anything in this world, and I would
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be the happiest girl in the world, but I can't be under
this cloud of deceit." He didn't say anything. (Tr. 66)
l. CONCEALED BANK ACCOUNT: It was upon his return from the Guard trip drunk, that the concealed check-book fell from his pants, showing that for
months before he had deposited money and checked on
it without her knowledge. This she discovered in late
August or early September 1955, ( Tr. 70) and related
to money concealed in January of the same year.

m. PROPHYLACTIC KIT: Among his things at
the home she found exhibit 39 which counsel for Mr.
Lund stipulated "are for prevention of venerial disease
after intercourse if used as directed." (Tr. 76)
n. PORNOGRAPHIC HANDKERCHIEFS: Exhibit 40 constitutes four such; plaintiff did not want her
husband filling his mind with such things, nor have them
about the house. ( (Tr. 78) As counsel e:x:amined the
exhibit and "definitely" stated there was no objection,
Mrs. Lund, observing their examination of them in court,
said: "It makes no difference to him that I find those
things; he thinks it is just a lort of hooey; there is nothing
sacred about our marriage, so he makes light of it." (Tr.
78) It was talk about such things that Orin and Polly
had with President Harline 16 months before when
Orin said she had misjudged him, that "he wasn't guilty,
he was a clean man." (Tr. 79)
o. LIE ABOUT CONDRUMS: Exhibit 42, the
cigaret lighter, is relevant in that in the former trial
condrums had been found in the box; Orin had said in
-11-
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the reconciliation talk with President Harline the lighter
itself had been stolen, and that someone had pushed the
condrum_s, in evidence in the former trial, into the "cover
around the cigarette lighter and that he was innocent."
Now, in late August 1955 Mrs. Lund finds the lighter,
and the former lie became evident. (Tr. 80) It is the
deceit that is important, not the lighter!
p. BRUTALITY: The day after Labor Day, 1955 he
came to her office near the mink operation and demanded: "I want my bank statements." He was admonished
"I am checking them over and am not through with them;
they are not your bank statements, they are our bank
statements." He thereupon struck appellant three times
with his fist, and kicked her down the basement steps
with his foot. He blackened the eye of ~Irs. Lund's
mother, and then ran, son James seeing. He got his
clothes and left the house, and has not returned. (Tr. 81
to 86) Plaintiff had to see a doctor and was treated,
expense involved.
9. ALIMONY DUE: Plaintiff-appellant proved at
the time of the said trial delinquent payments ordered to
be paid her by respondent were unpaid in the sum of $3,597.93. (Exhibit -l:G, Tr. 12-l:) This giYes him credit for
$950.00 paid, and the balance is aliinony and support
money, excepting the full period when they lived together,
plus the specific bills Judge Larson ordered hin1 to pay
of $697.93 which he did not pay. As of April 1, 1957,
the sum of $3,597.93 was in arrears. Judge Harding
ignored this entire subject.
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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10. .A!TTORNEY FEES: Appellant requested the
court to require respondent to pay her attorney fees.
(Tr. 126) She stated it had been a long and arduous
litigation, and she had no funds. At this time defendant
had filed an appeal of Judge Larson's overruling his
motion for a new trial. Defendant seems to have now
abandoned that appeal. Plaintiff's counsel was sworn
and made a statement of the entire long matters, and
the difficult trial for which the original court ordered
defendant to pay $200 as .attorney fees. That is unpaid
to this day. He further outlined his work, showing sincere attempts to see the reconciliation work, but upon
it.s failing, more work was involved. He requested, in
addition to the $200 before awarded, the additional sum
of $750 as attorneys fees, (Tr. 132) but this was not
given because the court found condonation had estopped
both p.arties, and the divorce was annulled.
At the end of ·the Harding trial, becnuse the court
had stated it did not regard plaintiff as having any
rights because of living for more than one year with
defendant, plaintiff filed an extensive brief exceeding
forty page·s. As will be seen from the supplemental
appeal, there have been additional matters for which
attorney fees are asked.
11.

JUDGE HARDINGS DECISION: On May 13,

1957 this judge served a memorandum decision holding
that "plaintiff condoned the misconduct of defendant"
by the reconciliation, finding :
-18-
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a. "This reconciliation was without express condition, and the court finds it was not conditional," and
b. "Any mi_sconduct of the defendant from which
arose the original grounds for divorce was condoned and
forgiven by plaintiff." (Tr. 141-143)
It is from the decree and findings that plaintiff
now appeals.
12. TEMPORARY ALIMONY, S U P P 0 R T
MONEY, AITTORNEY FEES: Pursuant to the Harding decision, plaintiff sought temporary relief; hearing
has been had, and from the decision of Judge Aldon
Anderson, a supplementary appeal is being perfected to
accompany this major appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS
ON THE UNCONTESTED ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF
THE MISCONDUCT.
POINT II.
THE OOURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CONDONED THE WRONGS OF RESPONDENT. THE COURT
IGNORED THE LAW OF UTAH.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE RECONCILIATION WAS NOT ON CONDITION. THERE WERE CONDITIONS AND THEY WERE BROKEN.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND FOR
CONTEMPT.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ASSESS AND
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPELLANT.
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS
ON THE UNCONTESTED ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF
THE MISCONDUCT.

No where in the disposition of the case did Judge
Harding make .any reference to resumption of the misconducl before found by Judge Larson. The issue was
resolved on the simple proposition that if the parties
reconciled ~and lived together for a year, that ended it,
that plaintiff had condoned the offen.ses and forgave
them. The trial court ignored the law as clearly .announced by this court in
MAC DONALD v. MAC DONALD, 120 U 573,
236 P2 1066
BEEZLEY v. BEEZLEY, 296 P2 274
It is elementary that the court must make findings
on essential issues raised in the pleadings and at the
trial.
Plaintiff raised the issue by the pleading on page 43
of transcript, where she alleged, .and proved at the trial,
that ". . . he resumed the misconduct of which he was
charged and proven to be guilty in the principal trial."
This was in response to defendant's pleading on page
41 of transcript that plaintiff had condoned. But in
this pleading defendant admitted in his p.aragraph 3
" ... the parties had further difficulties." At no time in
the trial of this issue, on which defendant had the burden
of proof, (Tr. 52) did defendant dispute or argue that he
-15-
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had not resumed the conduct Judge L,arson had found
against him. He ignored the entire subject. It was in
his own case in chief that the resumption facts were
set irrevocably in the record by his examination of Mrs.
Lund, his first witness. Mr. Lund failed to dispute any
of the fundamental facts plaintiff established, and these
facts must be accepted as true, and the court must make
findings thereon which establish resumption of the misconduct. To ignore these facts is error. The facts to which
we make reference are in paragraph 8 of the Statement
of Facts under the heads from "a" to "p" inclusive.
At no time did he attempt to dispute, explain or alter
her testimony concerning: Indifference during her sickness, antagonism during her eye trouble, his drunkeness,
his perfume aroma and it's implications, his threat of
illegitimate sex, his argumentative attitude, receipt of
mysterious and feminine phone calls, three weeks at
National Guard camp when two only were needed, her
version of his lie about contraceptive talk with President
Harline. He left the entire subject of the batteries at
the end of their resumed life together, exactly as Mrs.
Lund had laid it in the record, attempting in no way to
explain or justify his vicious conduct. It is clear that
his whole case before Judge Harding "-as predicated on
the erroneous belief that the law was against his wife
when she went back to him and lived with him for a
year!
He did fiercely controvert that he had lied to her
about taking the sick man to the middle-west, testifying
that the day he returned from 3 weeks absence, he in-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sisted it was necessary to fly the rifle team on the
juncke·t. (Tr. 118) He had absented himself to guard
camp for the former three weeks, taking dress clothes
to Camp vVilliams, when mink work had to be done
at a time when she was too ill to do it and then he
went again. This court will form it's own opinion as to
whether he would use the reason of the junket as justification for leaving again, or plead the urgency of taking
the sick man to aid. (Tr. 90) The important thing is
that he cared nothing for his wife and child, for the
mink bu.siness, and left without sentiment, returning
drunk!
He did testify he'd told his wife about the private
checking account, (Tr. 115) but this was at the time
of reconciliation. But he there agreed they would keep
all their ·accounts together and tell her everything. (Tr.
113, 119) It was 9 months later that he was still making
secret deposits and withdrawals; and had he died, on
one of his junkets, appellant would have hurried him
without aid of that fund; it would have gone in ignorance
to his mother instead of his wife. (Tr. 119) This was
not an agreement kept. It was one broken, and a resumption of his misconduct. His attempt at explanation does
not exculpate him in the least.
Regarding the prophylatic kit, exhibit 39, found by
Mrs. Lund just before the battery, he did not address
himself to the subject except that his counsel stipulated
what could be accomplished therewith when well used.
(Tr. 76) His only inference of legitimate possession to
-17-
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said exhibit is on page 108 relating to other implements
suggesting outside activities.
With clear findings by the former court, the reappearance of worse paraphernalia during a time when
each was to completely share with each other what they
had between them (Tr. 113) there is clear, undisputed
evidence of resumption, a return to misconduct.
The importance of finding these paraphanalia is
interestingly discussed by the California court in Arnold
v. A rno.ld, 174 P2d 67 4, a case to which this court made
reference in deciding Mac Donald, v. Mac Donald, supra.
In the Arnold case, the court said:
"At about the same time appellant found in
his pocket an article that is used in sexual intercourse which justifiably caused her to assume
that his adulteries had not ceased. His fatuous
explanation that he had found the article in a
box in the basement does not furnish a legitimate
reason for his carrying it in his pocket."
It was only natural in the face of respondent stating
to her that if he could not get what he wanted at home,
he knew he could get it illegitimately. (Tr. 66) See what
effect it had on her at the top of p;age 61 of the record.
And the finding of pornographic handkerchiefs and the
little man on a cut-out-card his sister described (Tr. 104,
Ex. 45) forced the honorable Judge Harding to make
some reference to a resu1nption of the misconduct. But
the findings are l'lilent! Does forgiveness and attempts
at reconciliation eo me at such a high price 1 It will make
bad law to condone such resumption!
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Respondent tried to lessen the importance of the
pornographic hankerchiefs (Ex. 40) by the most interesting testimony that his wife has been told by her
attorney to lie, not about the existence of the hankerchiefs, but alone as to where they were kep't, as if this
would alter the fact that he had resumed the misconduct!
(Tr. 107) The testimony of respondent's .sister as to
how he came by the pornography is relevant as to his
whole attitude on resumption. (Tr. 102)
In Angell v. Angell, 191 P2d 54, the California court
dispo.ses of a very important condonation case, helpful to
this court, but ignored by the trial court in this case.
There the trial court ignored, as here, the uncontested
evidence, and decided that if the p.arties had gone back
together the court had no discretion to hear or find issues
of how they came to resume. The learned trial court
in our case committed the identical error; and in reversing, the California high court held:
"The state is interested in saving the marriage if possible. That purpose would seldom be
effectual if the innocent p.arty could not dare try
to effect a reconciliation at the peril of losing the
right to secure a final decree. It is in the public
interest for the courts to encourage person.s who
have secured an interlocutory to become reconciled."
On the matter of the failure of the trial court to
use discretion, and find according to the record that
court held:
-19-
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"But where the evidence, and the inferences
therefrom, are all one way, the trial court has
no discretion to refuse the relief warranted by
such evidence. As was said in O'Connell v. Superior Court, 240 P 294, "Where there is a legal
right to relief under certain facts, and the existence of such facts is not questioned, a court
having juri'Sdiction has no discretion to refuse
the relief."
It was clear error of the trial court in failing to
make findings of fact on the uncontested issue of resumption of respondent's misconduct.
POINT II.
'THE OOURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CONDONED THE WRONGS OF RESPONDENT. THE COURT
IGNORED THE LAW OF UTAH.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has recently and clearly laid down the law of condonation in
Mac Donald vs. McDonald, 120 Ut. 573, 236 P2d 1066
where Judge Crockett wrote:
". . . . where the defendant's mi.sconduct is
resumed, the law permits the injured party to
assert all of the prior misconduct as well as that
occuring subsequent to the condonation."
The Utah court then cited the following powerful
cases, all in point:
ARNOLD vs. ARNOLD, 76 Cal. App. 2d, 877 ~
174 P2d 674.
BURT vs. BURT, 48 Wyo. 19; 41 P2d 524.
THUMB vs. THU~fB, 105 Colo. 352; 98 P2d 279.
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In the MacDonald case, decided in 1951 the erring
party resumed the misconduct, and the court laid down
the above language which the trial judge failed and
refused to employ in this ca.se.
The other and more recent case is Beezley vs.
Beezley, 296 P2d 27 4 where the court adopted broad,
widely used language as follows:
"Our holding here is in accord with 17 Am.
Jur. 258, sect. 213, REVIVAL OF CONDONED
OFFENSES: Condonation of the violation of
the marital duties and obligations is conditioned
on the future good conduct of the offending
spouse, and a subsequent offense on his or her
part revokes or nullifies the condonation and
revives the original offense as a cause for divorce.
"In other words, condonation ceases to be
a defense to a divorce suit where the condoned
offense is repeated. The general rule i.s that to
constitute a revival of the condoned offense, the
offending spouse need not be guilty of the same
character or degree of offense as that condoned;
any misconduct is sufficient which indicates that
the condonation is not accepted in good faith and
upon the reasonable conditions implied ... "
We summarize the repetition of offenses. Before
doing so, may we lay principal emphasis on the fact of
the brutality practiced at the finale of the former repetitions. Respondent admitted the brutality first by pleading at page 41 of the transcript, wherein he stated:
"'the p.artie.s had farther difficulties." Those difficulties
were clearly described by Mrs. Lund, and Mr. Lund
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cerning it. He left it as she had put it in the record.
It was inflicted when he asked for "his bank statements,"
and she had said: "I am not through with them but they
are not your bank statements, they are our bank statements." (Tr. 81)
"Orin, let's get upstairs and we can talk this
over, and he said take your hands off of me or
I will knock you flat, .and he did.... Then he hit
me right here, (indicating) and knocked me flat
... Right here by my chin, or the side here ...
with his fist ... so hard it knocked me right flat
immediately ... My mother came running and had
me half way picked up from the back, and that
is when he hit her ... In the eye ... my mother
started to pick me up.That is when he hit her .. .
I carried a bruise on my jaw for some time .. .
It wa.s out in the open by the basement steps,
and after he struck my mother, I got up and
started tussling with him and he knocked me
down again. I was afraid he was going to go
after my mother, but he knocked me down again,
I believe, three times, and I started to run up
the steps and that is when he turned and kicked
me down the steps ... \Vith his foot, and it hit
me right here . . . Son Jimmy was at the top
of the steps . . . He was upset as we were and
he was shaken up by the fact that Orin had beat
my mother and I up ... He (Orin) ran out and
got in his oar and got his clothes and left ... he
has never been back ... I gathered my mother up
and went directly to the Memorial ~iedical Clinic
. . . Doctor . . . treated me and put me under
sedative and I had to go home and go to bed ...
expenses, yes."
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In summarizing the resumption of misconduct before
the .above batteries, reference is made to the Findings
of Judge Larson so as to tie up the fact that it was
resumption, repetition. Note paragraph 8 of the within
"Statement of Facts."
Judge Larson found in his Memorandum Decision:
The record shows an utter lack of affeetion or consideration and no thought of her illness, (a serious and
probably incurable condition)." (Tr. 10) In his Findings:
"The defendant has mistreated plaintiff in a cruel inhuman manner over a long period ... has quarreled with
her without just cause, nagged at her . . . displayed a
cool, indifferent attitude ... he was in military service.
Upon return there was found . . . some evidence of
possible infidelity ... exhibition of certain paraphanalia
suggestive of his possible infidelity ... caused plaintiff
great emotional and mental distress when coupled with
his cold and indifferent emotional behavior toward her
... He has absented himself at night ... without appropriate explanation . . . told her he did not love her . . .
suggested marriage be broken up ... ; defendant had
filed former suit for divorce ... the .attitude of defendant
toward this marriage has not been sound and wholesome.
He has exhibited a snappy, dictatorial attitude ... has
had a contemptible disposition about having his own
way . . . continually critic.al of plaintiff ... exhibited
a lack of courtesy and grace due and lack of affectionate
con.sideration or of civil consideration during her illness
... he has used the mink operation as an excuse to harass
-23-
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and annoy plaintiff. As a result plaintiff's health has
been seriously impaired . . . she suffers from either
multiple sclerosis or Menier's syndrome ... Her recovery
is not foreseeable ... she lacks equilibrium ... will be
unable to do hard manual labor ... Considerable of the
accumulated possessions are the result of her hard work
and business accumen. Plaintiff has been .a good wife
to defendant ... has been careful and prudent with the
money of the family ... The plaintiff's health will not
stand any further arguing or bickering." (Tr. 13-16)
In the face of these findings, the present record
is explicit. To avoid repetition, please refer back to paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts. He was indifferent
to her during her illness after re·sumption when she
was hospitalized with surgery, was antagonized because
.she had an eye loss, temperature; he stayed .away on
trips longer than need be when the mink needed him,
returning only to go again; and returned time after
time drunk; his body smelled of strange perfume several
times ; he flatly told her he could get his sex elsewhere;
he was argumentative and picked on everything, was
mean, hateful; received mysterious phone calls and from
women late at night; he lied to her about his travels
with the rifle team and about money matters. There
was the return of the paraphanalia" suggestive of infidelity" in exhibit 39, the vernerial kit, the pornographic
hankerchiefs, exhibit 40, whieh when coupled "ith his
thre.at about sex elsewhere, were enough of themselves to
constitute a finding of resu1nption of cruel conduct. Then
the lie about the former condrums shown by the cigaret
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lighter incident further shows his return to marital
relations was not in good faith.
Indeed, appellant alleged in an appropriate pleading: "he resumed the misconduct of which he was
charged and proven to be guilty in the principal trial,
and for which decree and findings have been entered... "
(Tr. 43) And now the proof is evident, undisputed,
admitted.
Further reference to the broad legal principles to
which this court is committed will show Judge Harding
committed error in failing to find the true facts, and
apply the law of this court. This court cited three cases
in the MacDonald decision. The first was Arnold vs.
Arnold, 174 P2d 674 where the California court found
the man had carried "in his pocket an article that is used
in sexual intercourse which justifiably caused her to
assume that his adulteries had not ceased."
The court said :
"Appellant's condonation of respondent's
past offenses w.as upon the statutory condition
that ~he should thereafter be treated with conjugal kindness. By reason of the acts of respondent oecuring after the reconciliation, only a brief
outline of which has been given, the condonation
effected was revoked ... The revocation of the
condonation revived the original causes of action
for divorce, both extreme cruelty and adultry."
In the case at bar, Mr. Lund resumed, and in defense
of Mrs. Lund's request for liquidation of moneys accrued
and due to her, he asserted she had completely forgiven
-25-
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the old offenses and could not utilize the decree of
divorce given; and the trial court went along. The court
was in error. The California court said:
"Since the condonation was revoked and since
the divorce should have been granted to appellant
on both grounds charged in her cross complaint,
cruelty and adultry, everything that had occurred
both before and after the reconciliation, the long
continued cruel conduct of respondent and his
two years of adulterous relations with the correspondent, should have been given weight in
determining the division of the .community property. In view of respondent's unquestioned and
admitted misconduct the court erred in making
an equal division. Appellant was entitled to much
more than one half."
California has a statute which this court has in effect
adopted in it's decisions above cited, to the effect that
"When the condonee commits acts constituting a like
or other cause of divorce, or when the condonee is
guilty of great conjugal unkindness, not amounting to a
cause of divorce but sufficiently habitual and gross to
show that the conditions of condonation had not been
accepted in good faith, or not fulfilled" the condonation
is revoked.
The .acts of re.spondent in our case, since the attempted reconciliation, are of themselves grounds for
divorce and in addition, they are revival: the condonee
is guilty of great conjugal unkindnes.s, and he did not
accept the conditions with good faith.
In MacKay v. lJfcl{ay cited by this court supra, the
Arkansas court, ( 290 SW 951) stated ". . . the right
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of condonation lies with the innocent spouse, and not with
the guilty one." This is a well established doctrine of
equity, tied in with "he who would have equity should
do equity." How could our trial court give Mr. Lund the
full and unqualified equitable defense of condonation
when he was the guilty party, wholly, and had done no
equity, and his hands were not clean~
Our trial court found that the reconciliation was
not on condition, but note what the Colorado court said
in Thumb v. Thumb, 98 P2d 279, the last of the cases
cited by this court in the MacDonald case :
"If prior to the separation, the husband had
condoned the acts of cruelty of which he complained by continuing the marital relationship
after their occurrence and his knowledge of them,
or if it be assumed that by entering into the agreement he condoned such acts of cruelty, this in
and of itself would not be a bar available under
all circumstances to prevent his bringing an
action for divorce. CONDONATION IS ALWAYS CONDITIONAL. It is conditioned on
the assumption that there will be no repetition of
the conduct condoned. Such a repetition voids the
condonation and makes available as grounds for
divorce not only the acts committed subsequent
to the condonation but also those which have been
condoned.''
Why Mr. Lund asserted condonation is apparent:
He had failed to pay the family bills the court ordered
him to pay, together with alimony and support money
for his sick wife and child (Tr. 23) and owed his wife
$3,597.93 (Ex. 46, Tr. 124, 126) He was in contempt of
court! He had no other way out and took it, only to have
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the court go along and estop the appellant from claiming
her vested rights. But the court erred, and must be reversed.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE RECON•CILIATION WAS NOT ON CONDITION. THERE WERE CONDITIONS, AND THEY WERE BROKEN.

The trial court found .at page 143: "This reconciliation was without express condition, and the court finds
it to be not conditional." Nothing could be further from
the truth, both in fact and in law.
It was respondent's own counsel, not appellant's,
who developed the conditions :

"Q. Was there any condition made on your getting back together~
A.

During the conversation we discussed our
church activity, and Orin being an Elder and
my sincere desire was to get the house in
order and go through the temple . . . have
Jimmy sealed to us . . . that the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth would
be told by both of us, completely. I specified
that to Orin ... because that has been one of
my complaints with Orin, he has not told me
the truth ... about everything, what he did
and why he wa:s doing it." (Tr. 56)

The record is full of the circu1nstances on which
these things were thrashed out with the stake president.
We will not repeat. But Orin was not truthful either
before or after the reconciliation. He had lied about the
-28Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

condrums with the president, as shown by Mrs. Lund
finding the cigaret lighter. (Tr. 79) He lied about his
private checking account. (Tr. 96, 97, 115-117) While
he declared he told his wife ,about the money, he may
have done this prior to the reconciliation; but for him to
u.se that account after reconciliation, making deposits and
drawing on same during a time when they had agreed
everything would be in common between them, was not
honest. He would never have told his wife that his
mother, not his wife, would have the balance if he died!
This was a fraud, and it broke the condition.
In the face of the doctrine of Thumb v. Thumb,
supra, that "Condonation is always conditional,'' .and
this as a matter of law, how can the decision of Judge
Harding stand? It can't, he was in error.
The importance of conditions is well tried out and
explained in the following California cases, all of which
were before the trial court by brief, before he made his
error:

Angel v. Angel, 191 P. 2d 54;
Hellbush v. Hellbush, 290 P. 18;
Lane v. Superior Court, 285 P. 860;
Butterfield v. Butterfield, 34 P. 2 145;
Olson v. Superior Court, 165 P. 706, 1 ALR
1589;
Slusher v. Slusher, 193 P. 2d 778.
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In .Angel v. .Angel, supra, the supreme court said:
"Whether an agreement is an unconditional
one of forgiveness .and therefore justifies the
denial of the final decree or a conditional one, and
therefore warrants the granting of the final decr.ee, is a question of fact. If the evidence or the
reasonable inferences therefrom, is conflicting,
the determination of the question by the trial
court, in accordance with elementary principles,
is conclusive on the appellate court." (page 57)
There is no conflict in the evidence. The conditions exacted by appellant were never contradicted. Respondent
virtually adopted her statement of the circumstances,
except for irrelevant matters. (Tr. 109) They agreed
to h.ave things confidential, "everything that you had
w~s to be her's and everything she had was to be yours?
That is true." (Tr. 113) Certainly there were reasonable conditions. There could not help but be. Note Mr.
Lund admits at page 113 of his testimony the entire
subject of the "handkerchiefs and the contraceptives
w.as discussed with Polly . . . and with President Harline." This meant his conduct. We will not further labor
it.

Bajakian v. Bajakian, 57 R.I. 470, 109 ALR
1001 et sec.
The Angell case, supra, embraces the following pert
language, decisive of the issue :
"The resumption of marital relations was
based on the express agreement of the parties that
the reconciliation should be conditional. There is
not one word of evidence to the contrarY. and defendant does not contend that there is. Defendant
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contents himself with the mere assertion that
where parties resume marita:l relations whether
the final decree shall be granted rests in the discretion of the trial court. But that does not mean
at the whim or c,aprice of the trial court. It means
a legal discretion guided by law. When the law
is clear the only discretion is to follow the law.
"There being no evidence and no inference
from the evidence to support the implied finding
that the forgiveness here involved was unconditional, and the uncontr.adicted evidence showing
that the forgiveness was conditional, we are of
the opinion that the action of the trial court in
refusing to grant the final decree was .an abuse of
discretion. The order appealed from is reversed."
Our trial court refused to apply the law in a clear case
where there were reasonable conditions, in the face of
which he found there were no conditions.
The Utah Supreme Court has not labored the question of conditions. It is on the sound ground simply
of resumption of the misconduct. It has followed the
Colorado court in Thumb v. Thumb, supra, where "Condonation is always conditional." But if this court desires
to examine this record on the cited California cases of
condition the record wiH support appellant on that
ground too. The trial court was clearly in error.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND FOR
CONTEMPT.

The trial court had before it an "Order To Show
Cause" why respondent should not be required to pay
-31-
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appellant the sum of $2400 as accrued alimony and
support money. (Tr. 38) Brought down to the date of
the trial, the money owed by respondent was $3,597 .92.
(Tr. 48) and proof was made before Judge Harding
thereof.
These moneys accrued pursuant to Judge Larson's
Decree wherein he had found: "Plaintiff is presently
without funds, she having sufficiently exhausted the
cash resources at her disposal as to make it necessary at
once for defendant to begin the alimony and support
money payments, regardless of any appellate procedure
that might be instituted by the defendant." (Tr. 15) In
addition, there was mandate for him to pay certain accrued bills. ( Tr. 23) The alimony and support money
was to be paid at $175 per month, plus $200 attorney
fees.
The above liquidated sum of $3,597.92 does not include any accrual for moneys during the attempted reconciliation. It includes accrual of $225 before the attempted reconciliation, $697.93 for payments to doctors,
groceries, and the balance is for payments not made
after he committed the battery in September 1955 and
abandoned his wife and child. During the entire period,
he paid $950 at the r.ate of less than $50 per month, solely for his son James, when the court had specified he pay
$75 .support money, and $100 as alimony. See Ex. -16,
and transcript p. 124.
In failing to pay these amounts, he was carrying
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out his threat to appellant wherein he s.aid, and he did
not ever dispute or answer this testimony:
". . . he said he was going to leave me and
when he left me that he was going to leave me
absolutely penniless, cut my allowance out until
I would never know I had a penny." (Tr. 59)
He did, and is doing, just that! And she is .a sick woman,
with a "serious and probably incurable condition." (Tr.
10, 58)
The trial court in finding condonation, estopped
appellant from asserting rights to said $3,597.93 and declared she was in effect still married to respondent, notwithstanding he was doing nothing for her. She w.as
awarded the house on Millcreek Way (Tr. 15) but there
was a "balance due on said home of between $9000 and
$10,000." (Tr. 12) She has had to protect this equity
and she has. If respondent prevails in his position,
her sacrifice in borrowing to meet these monthly payments will h.ave enured to him.
The trial court found that respondent had made an
absolute gift of the mink to her as a condition of her
remaining at home during his military travels. (Tr. 14)
She has had to feed those mink, during a time when she
was getting no help from him.
Appellant got the insurance policies long before
taken out, but nothing to pay the premiums except her
alimony. That is part of why the court ordered the payment of the alimony and support money regardless of
appellate procedures. (Tr. 23) And in the supplemental
-33-
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brief, it will be shown how she has had to go into debt
to keep up the house payments, feed the mink, herself,
his child, and pay the in.surances.
Did the orders to pay these sums accrue~ Are they
a vested right in appellant~ Should she be awarded these
sums~ The answer is "yes,'' and there are two bases for
argument:
A. If respondent wanted to stay the accrual of
these obligations, during the time his motion for new
trial was being considered, he should have filed a supersedeas bond under the rules applicable, but he did not.
The order to pay may be regarded as temporary alimony.
The statute 30-3-3 UCA gives the court power to enter
the orders it did. Under Rules 58A, 59, 62 a, b, d, and h,
the rights of the parties to deal with the order to pay
money are stated, and Rule 54 b is also apposite. Respondent has done nothing to stay the accrual of appellants rights, .and they have vested.
B. The vesting of rights to receive accrued alimony
and support money is clearly stated by the court in
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P. 2d 528 stating: " ... the
right to collect such in.stallments becomes vested upon
their due date." It will be argued that by the reconciliation appellant divested herself. At the least, she did not
divest herself of that which had accrued prior to the
attempt to reconcile, in the sum of $:.2:25. (Ex. 46) But
the court even ignored this small sum.
If appellant divested herself of vested rights by
condonation, then the bills are .all respondent's as his
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wife. But this argument is specious, worthless. These
parties are obviously at the end of everything. The
marriage is a "wreck," and in the language of MacDonald
v. MacDonald, supra, this court must "pronounce a benediction on the wreck" and in justice and equity, use the
best mean.s of "arrangement of the property and income
of the parties" and this is to find respondent resumed
his misconduct, restore appellant to her decree, and require respondent to do what Judge Larson told him to do.
And punish him for contempt!
In considering the decision of the trial court, this
court will be bound to utilize its own criteria as stated
in Wilson v. Wilson, 296 Pd 977, and will give attention
to : " ... the age of the parties; ... their health; considerations relative to children; the money and property
they possess and how it was acquired," etc. Note in the
original Findings of F.act, Judge Larson stated appellant was very important in acquiring the family possessions. (Tr. 121) The fact that she is ill, probably incurable (Tr. 10), and has the child of the parties, should
leave no doubt in this court's mind, in the face of his
earnings and good health. ( Tr. 13) She h.ad done hard
physical labor of which she is no longer capable. This
court has many times admonished trial courts to take
these things into account. And his making over $400 a
month and sending less than $50 to cover the enormous
burdens of appell.ant is unworthy. (Tr. 124) It is contemptuous. Reference is here made to the supplementary
appeal and brief to follow, to show his continued attitude
of leaving this woman penniless.
-35-
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This case is just the opposite of Larsen v. Larsen,
300 P2 596, where this court excused the payment of
accrued alimony. In the case at bar, respondent knew
the family obligations, knew his wife's inability to meet
them alone, and the court had specifically ordered him to
pay, carving out any exception for appellate procedures.
(Tr. 22) This of itself makes the obligation in the nature
of temporary support, when respondent contemplated a
new trial. And when he left his sick and brutally beaten
wife and child as he did, knowing these thing.s, he ought
to have no defense or excuse, particularly when appellant makes no claim for help during the time they tried
to make a go of it.
It was the child that brought the attempted reconciliation and what appellant did must not prejudice that
child. The mother could not cut off the right of the child
for support. Price v. Price, 289 P2d 1044, Utah. And
it is apparent that the best interests of the child are that
he and his mother have the money the court earlier decreed should be paid.
It will produce sound results in broad public policy
for this court to find respondent broke the condonation;
that he must pay the bills. For this court to affinn the
Harding decision is a warning against attempts at reconciliation, and this is contrary both to general public
policy, and to the new statute recently enacted. Our law
now reads:
"It is the declared public policy of the State
to maintain desirable marital and family relationships, and to take reasonable 1neasures to pre-36Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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serve marriages, particularly where minor children are involved.... " (30-3-11, 1957 pocket sup~
plement, 1957 session.)
" ... no hearing for decree of divorce shall be
held by the court until 90 days shall have elapsed
from the filing of the complaint. . . . " (30-3-18
ibid.)
This means the law of Utah is designed to encourage
by all possible means the preservation of the marriage.
When the complaint is filed, does this mean the parties
are to remain ap,art absolutely for the 90 days, in peril
of condonation~ Of course it does not. The doctrines of
this court in the MacDonald and Beezley cases, supra,
take care; and if the attempted re.sumption is interfered
with by a resumption of the wrong named in the complaint, this court will not throw that plaintiff out. And
in the instant case, the parties and the public should be
encouraged to try just what the litigants at bar tried.
If the offending party resumes his misconduct, the innocent should not suffer. Again see Price v. Price, supra,
and Angel v. Angel, 191 P2 54, the California case
quoted, supra.
See the strong policy of the 1957 legislature for
enforcing accrued alimony when the innocent party is
on relief (30-3-22, 1957 session laws., pocket edition).
And when Mrs. Lund fortunately avoids the relief rolls,
she ought not to be penalized.
This court should enter judgment for the sum of
$3,597.93 as of April 1, 1957 and send the case back for
-37-
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the ,sole purpose of liquidating the intervening balance,
plus attorney fees and to punish respondent.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ASSESS AND
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPELLANT.

Appellant's counsel took the stand and testified as
to the arduous nature of this bitterly contested case, asking the court to take judicial notice of what is on file.
All parties worked for the I econciliation, including appellant's. ( Tr. 131) but it miserably failed because of
the contemptuous conduct of respondent.
Appellant was awarded $200 .attorney fees for the
original action which has never been paid. (Tr. 132)
Three years of work has subsequently gone into the case
that ultimately came before Judge Harding, for which
appellant asked the court to award $750 additional attorney fees but he ignored the subject. (Tr. 127) As an
example of the earnestness with which appellant's counsel has worked in the case, reference is made to the brief
filed with Judge Harding so that he could see the full
fact and law situation. But that has been ignored. (Tr.
See Supplemental Brief.)
We submit to this court the matter of fees, asking
that the attitudes of the respective parties be taken into
account. In the face of the contemptuous conduct of
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respondent manifested throughout the proceedings, there
was and is nothing for ·counsel to do but continue the
fight for justice and equity. The ethics of the bar require
nothing less.
In setting attorney fees, the court is requested to
take note of the following:
The Affidavit, and Order to Show Cause, soon
after the infliction of the battery, filed October 13, 1955,
was not heard, due to negotiations.
1.

2. After the battery and respondent's complete
abandonment of appellant, it became apparent the long
matter must be brought to an end, and this is manifest
by Notice Calling up Motions, (Tr. 33) which resulted
in the issue of condonation being framed by pleadings,
(Tr. 35, 41, 43). Appellant's Petition and the court's
Order. to Show Cause, ('Tr. 37, 38) finally came before
Judge Larson, together with all other matters, and it is
clear they were complicated, on December 22, 1956. The
preamble to the decree of that judge recites the great
work that had gone into the case both by coun;sel and
the court, looking for an amicable settlement; but it's
utter failure after bona fide attempts numerous times
drove Judge Larson to wash his hands of the case. Obviously he did not do this for. light cause; but appellant's
counsel has had to go on. The proof of his arduous
-39-
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labors is evident in this decree. ( Tr. 45) It was there
that condonation was saved for the trial that was later
had. The supplemental pleadings necessary to bring all
matters pending before the court, including accrued .alimony, etc., were all before the court; but when the trial
judge heard the ease, he was not interested in anything
but condonation.
The attitude.s of the litigants is clearly stated at page
122 of the record respecting difficulties to get financial
help to appellant. Respondent has balked every inch of
the way in paying the bills he contracted for the house,
insurance, etc. He has left them to his wife, who has had
to fight the difficult battle alone, and the equities in all
these things have been maintained only by her borrowing and s·cant living. Respondent's attitude has been to
defeat the divorce, by condonation, so that Mrs. Lund,
under his theory has been his wife all along; but he has
failed to assume a manly, decent respect for his obligations, whether .as husband, or as divorcee. It has been
necessary that appellant's attorney pe~sue the matter
diligently, and she says that he has. (Tr. 126)

STUBER v STUBER, 244 P2d 650, Utah
It is only just that this court assess the fees in the
amount conservatively reque.sted, that of $750 since the
original decree, .and to this part of the case.
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CONCLUSION
Finally, appellant asks this court to find that the
divorce decree entered February 10, 1954 is valid; that
she has not condoned the faults of respondent; that he
resumed his misconduct, reinstating the old decree; that
she have judgment for all alimony and support money
down to date, except the time they attempted to reconcile ;
that he be required to pay the bills Judge Lar,son ordered
him to pay; that he be adjudged in serious contempt;
that he be required to pay attorney fees, and that the
matters between them be given finality.
Respectfully submitted,

WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX,
Attorney for AppeUant
July 1957
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